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Abstract 
In 2017, Congress passed the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, which imposes a tax of 1.4 percent 
on the investment returns of highly endowed colleges and universities. One motivation for the 
law was that these colleges have not sufficiently used their extensive resources to reduce the high 
prices students pay. My thesis examines the relationship between changes in endowment values 
and colleges’ overall spending and spending by category, with a particular focus on financial aid. 
I take advantage of the exogenous variation in endowment values generated by the 2008 
financial crisis to establish a causal relationship. I find that changes in endowment values 
consistently result in changes in non-financial aid expenditures in the same direction. In the 
context of the 2008 financial crisis, falling endowments caused colleges to cut overall spending 
and spending in each category. However, colleges continued to support low-income students by 
providing financial aid to even more of them. My results imply that the tax is unlikely to be 
effective, since the income loss it generates is unlikely to prompt colleges to increase endowment 
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College endowments are an integral component to the financing of higher education 
institutions’ operations. Colleges and universities use endowments in addition to students’ tuition 
and annual gifts to fund their operations. Along with other types of expenditures, endowment 
spending may also facilitate access to higher education by spending on financial aid. In fiscal 
year 2017, higher education institutions effectively spent 4.4 percent of their endowments on 
student financial aid, faculty research, maintenance of facilities, and other institutional 
operations. Institutions with endowments above $1 billion are even more reliant on endowments 
for operational financing, effectively spending 4.8 percent of their endowments in 2017 (Seltzer, 
2018a).  
However, endowments are not like checking accounts from which colleges can withdraw 
funds at will. They are permanent sources of funds, which college leadership uses to invest in 
financial markets and generates subsequent liquid returns to finance college operations. In 2017, 
colleges enjoyed investment returns averaging 12.9 percent (Seltzer, 2018a). From 1996 to 2012, 
colleges’ aggressive investment in stocks (as opposed to bonds) and less conventional 
investments (timber, oil and gas, etc.) unlocked endowment growth that overcame inflation and 
depreciation pressures, and continued to grow exponentially (Eaton, 2017). 
In recent years, colleges, especially colleges with a big endowment, have been under fire 
for accusations that they “hoard” money and are not using their endowments to lower the cost of 
attending college. Between 2008 and 2018, published tuition and fees at private nonprofit four-
year institutions increased at an average rate of 2.4 percent per year beyond inflation (Ma et al., 
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2017). Meanwhile, payout from endowments remained constant at around 4.4 percent (Seltzer, 
2018a).  
As an attempt to create incentives for colleges to increase their endowment payouts, 
Congress passed the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act in 2017, which imposes a tax of 1.4 percent on the 
investment return of colleges with more than 500 students and $500,000 in endowment per 
student, breaking the corporate tax exemption that non-profit colleges’ endowments had been 
enjoying. This law may subject about 30 colleges and universities to endowment taxes within the 
first five years, and as many as 80 institutions over the next fifteen years (Seltzer, 2018b). Such a 
tax would mean that Harvard University would have to pay $43 million on its endowment 
returns in 2017, had those earnings been taxed (Halper, 2018). Colleges have reacted fiercely to 
the tax, claiming that this law imposes constraints on their ability to fund institutional operations 
and provide access to low-income students through financial aid funding (Seltzer, 2018a; Halper, 
2018). This claim implies that having a more sizable endowment causes colleges to spend more 
on financial aid. Yet the validity of this claim has not been rigorously proven.  
There is surprisingly very limited literature in Economics that studies endowment funds 
and how they are actually spent. Most reports on endowments and spending on financial aid 
takes for granted the causality and only looks at correlational relationships to conclude that 
colleges are not spending enough. The few existing studies on this topic mainly examine either 
endowment payouts on an aggregate level or investment strategies using endowment funds. 
Brown et al. (2014) is the only empirical work that closely examines the relationship between 
endowment size and a college’s spending. They found that colleges respond to negative shocks 
by reducing spending, but do not increase spending in response to positive shocks. However, 
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their study investigates annual aggregate endowment payout, and offers little insight into how 
endowments affect colleges’ expenditures across different spending categories.  
This thesis seeks to answer precisely that question. What do colleges use their 
endowments for? In particular, when college endowments grow, do they spend more on financial 
aid? The findings of this project have broad implications for public policy. If, indeed, having a 
big endowment causes colleges to fund more students, taxing colleges’ endowments would 
reduce the accessibility of higher education to low-income students. 
Existing theories on the role endowments play in higher education finance have 
implications for how it should be spent. If endowments exist to guarantee colleges of a stream of 
income in perpetuity, I should expect to see little change in endowment spending in the short-
run, even in response to economic shocks. If endowments exist primarily as a “rainy day fund” 
that colleges can fall back on in times of crisis, I should expect to see increases in endowment 
spending after endowment values fall due to negative shocks. It is worth noting that endowment 
shocks are correlated with shocks to other sources of income such as tuition and gifts. This 
correlation implies that endowments might be limited in their ability to serve as “rainy day 
funds.” Some economists also argue that economic reasons fail to convincingly explain why 
endowments exist, and propose non-economic explanations, such as prestige (as signaled 
through the size of the endowment). 
In order to investigate the causal effect that endowments have on colleges’ spending 
breakdown, I use the 2008 financial crisis to introduce exogenous variation. The problem with 
using a descriptive comparison across colleges with different endowment levels is that colleges 
with endowments of different sizes may be different in important ways, which might be 
responsible for the different levels of endowment spending. For instance, colleges take different 
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approaches with respect to investing their endowments at a point in time. A college that is trying 
to increase endowment spending might invest more aggressively and adjust its portfolio 
according to market conditions, so this adjustment is endogenous. 
In order to address this problem, I will exploit exogenous variation in endowment levels 
caused by the financial crisis. Since endowment funds are routinely invested in financial market 
(or in investments whose returns are typically correlated with those in financial markets), highly 
endowed colleges would have been hit hard by the financial crisis. The finances of colleges with 
a smaller endowment would not have been as strongly affected. These details generate 
exogenous variation in changes in endowment levels across schools that differ by endowment 
size prior to the financial crisis. This exogenous variation provides an avenue to determine the 
effect of endowment levels on different spending categories within the same institution over 
time. Because of its random nature, the financial crisis had effects on actual spending that are 
unlikely to manifest themselves in ways other than through the money available through the 
endowment. 
I use institution-level panel data from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data 
System (IPEDS), developed by the National Center for Education Statistics. The IPEDS data set 
provides me with rich information from the 2005-2006 to the 2016-2017 academic years on an 
extensive array of institutional characteristics, including financial aid, endowment values, and 
other financial characteristics of 94 liberal arts colleges with endowment per capita of at least 
$50,000 in 2005-2006. Focusing only on liberal arts colleges allows me to examine institutions 
that have a simpler business model that is not complicated by divided commitments (revenue-
generating sports teams, professional schools, etc.). Focusing on those with at least some 
meaningful endowment is important because only these schools were meaningfully affected by 
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the financial crisis. I can also control for time-invariant characteristics that are unique to an 
institution (such as location, stated mission and values), and any year-specific national events 
that affected all institutions. My identification therefore examines changes in spending within the 
same institution over time. 
I find that decreases in endowment values are consistently accompanied by decreases in 
net tuition revenue, the amount of tuition collected from students after accounting for any types 
of aid, and private gifts, grants and contracts, the amount of private donations made to a college. 
The decrease in tuition revenue results from the fact that the financial crisis caused families to 
suffer losses in income and wealth and so reduced their ability to finance a college education. 
The decrease in private gifts, grants and contracts stems from the fact that these donations are 
highly correlated with market conditions. The triple decreases in endowment wealth, tuition 
revenue and private donations create pressures on colleges to cut expenses. A one-dollar 
decrease in endowment values results in an 8-cent decrease in total spending for all colleges. 
Colleges also choose to cut spending in less essential spending categories, such as academic 
support and student service expenses, so that they do not have to cut down as much on 
instruction expenses.  
I also examine the impact on financial aid spending, as proxied by percentage of students 
who receive some financial aid and the average amount of institutional aid received per student. 
During the financial crisis, a reduction in endowment values caused colleges to increase overall 
spending on financial aid because they admitted more students who had become eligible for 
financial aid, and not by increasing average amount of aid per student. This pattern remains 
consistent even when broken down by meet-full-need status. This suggests that at least in the 
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short run, colleges would not seek to reconcile losses in endowment values by hurting low-
income students.  
My findings have important implications for the endowment tax policy debate. Overall, it 
is unlikely that the tax will fulfill its promise of incentivizing colleges to spend more. In fact, my 
findings suggest that colleges would respond to the tax imposition with budget cuts. My results 
also suggest that if students’ financial needs increase, colleges are committed to meeting those 
needs even when their endowments fall. This implies that the tax imposition is limiting colleges’ 
ability to help their low-income students. 
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2. Background 
A university endowment is a fund that is made up of money originally donated to a 
college to serve the institution (Sherlock et al., 2018). It can hold cash or property, with different 
types of long-term and short-term investments. It is invested in different types of financial 
instruments, and the returns from those investments are used to finance university operations, 
capital expenditures, special projects, and reinvestment. An endowment usually includes 
different funds that were created from different agreements between the donors and the 
institution. 
There are four types of endowments: unrestricted, term, quasi and restricted. If a donation 
is made to a university without any restrictions and can be used at the discretion of the recipient 
institution, that is an unrestricted endowment (Kenton, 2018). Term endowments are 
endowments that require the principals to remain intact for a specified amount of time, and can 
only be spent after that time period has passed. A quasi-endowment is a donation made to 
dedicate towards a cause or a specific purpose. Typically, the principal is retained in the 
endowment, while the earnings or returns are distributed according to the donor’s wish. 
Restricted endowments are endowments whose principals are held in perpetuity, while the 
returns from their investment are distributed based on the donor’s request. The total value of an 
endowment is the sum of all of these four types. In my empirical analysis, I use this total value as 
the endowment size. 
Up until the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, endowments were exempted from taxation for one of 
two reasons. Either that an endowment is part of a non-profit organization or a government 
entity, hence has tax-exempt status, or it itself serves charitable and educational purposes, which 
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makes up the 501(c)(3) status (cited in Sherlock et al., 2018). Investment earnings were also tax 
exempt.  
The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act imposes a 1.4 percent tax on the returns of investment of 
endowments of colleges with more than $500,000 per student for colleges with more than 500 
students, applicable to tax years starting January 1, 2018.1 Net investment income is defined as 
the sum of gross investment income and capital gain, less expenses associated with that income. 
Gross investment income is widely defined, ranging from interests, dividends, rents, and 
royalties. According to Congress’ Joint Committee on Taxation, the tax is expected to raise an 
annual revenue of $200 million for the government, and $1.8 billion in revenue over the 10-year 
period, from 2018 to 2027, over which the Act is effective (Sherlock et al., 2018). 
 College endowments are not subject to a payout requirement, unlike private foundations 
and non-profit organizations, which are subjected to an annual payout requirement of 5 percent 
to prevent accumulation of tax-exempt funds (Sherlock et al., 2018). This difference stems from 
the fact that the endowment has 501(c)(3) status, and so does not fall under the category of 
private foundations. Private foundations are also subjected to a tax of as much as 2 percent on net 
investment income, which serves as private foundations’ share of the cost of government 
oversight of the sector (as cited in Sherlock et al., 2018). It is likely that Congress’ decision to 
impose a tax on endowment funds through the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act also serves a similar 
purpose, which might indicate a future increase in oversight over how universities spend their 
endowments. 
 Most university endowments adhere to a payout policy that applies to a multi-year 
moving average of endowment values (Brown et al., 2014; Brown and Tiu, 2013). Therefore, 
there is a distinction between two forms of “payout rate”:  one being the “policy payout rate,” 
                                                
1 For the full text of the Bill, see https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/1 
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which is the rate specified in the spending policy and applied to a moving average of prior years’ 
endowment value; the other being the actual payout rate, calculated as the amount of dollar 
payout divided by the endowment value of the current year. Since the policy payout rate takes 
into account endowment values of previous years, financial shocks during the current year 
should not disrupt the payout value during that same year, but will have an effect on the payout 
values in the following years through the moving average formula, hence smoothing out 
variations in the payout amounts across the years (Brown et al., 2014; Brown and Tiu, 2013).  
From 2008 to 2017, on average, colleges and universities paid out between 4.2 to 4.6 
percent of their endowment values (Seltzer, 2018a). In 2017, universities with the largest 
endowments (of over $1 billion) paid out 4.8 percent on average, almost one-percentage point 
above those with the smallest endowments (of less than $25 million). They also relied on their 
endowments to finance as much as 12.1 percent of their operating budgets. For institutions with 
endowments of $51 million to $100 million that figure was 6.2 percent (as cited in Sherlock et 
al., 2018). Institutions with bigger endowments are also more likely to increase real endowment 
payout over time, and tend to be more consistent with their annual payouts (Seltzer, 2018a). This 
is not surprising, since institutions with smaller endowments probably face more financial 
pressures and have less resources to rely on, which means they need to adjust their payouts more 
frequently and more dramatically to respond to market conditions. Private institutions also 
exhibit higher average payout rates than public institutions, partly because the former group 
tends to have endowments of larger sizes (Sherlock et al., 2018). 
Endowment wealth is also heavily concentrated in a small group of elite research 
universities and liberal arts colleges. In fiscal year 2017, 27 private colleges and universities with 
at least $1 billion dollars in endowment assets account for more than 75 percent of total 
 10 
endowment wealth; Harvard, Yale, Princeton, Stanford and the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology alone accounting for more than 22 percent (Sherlock et al., 2018). Endowment 
wealth is also concentrated among private doctoral-granting universities, of which the average 
endowment per student was $360,787, double that of private bachelor’s-granting institutions 
($190,314), and more than ten times that of public doctoral-granting universities ($27,092) 
(Sherlock et al., 2018).  
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3. Literature 
The theoretical literature on endowments and their role in higher educational finance is 
quite rich. Tobin (1974) put forward the view that endowments exist to smooth income. That is, 
the university has an obligation to generations in perpetuity, and so has to make sure that future 
generations can enjoy the activities that the present generation can enjoy. An implication of this 
is that endowment spending should not change much, even in response to shocks, because short-
term shocks are negligible given the long horizon of perpetuity (Brown et al., 2014). 
Hansmann (1990) provides an extensive review of potential explanations for the 
existence of endowments. Among the eleven possible explanations he described, the most 
significant four include: “to maintain intergenerational equity,” the idea that the university has an 
obligation to ensure that future generations can enjoy the same activities that the current 
generation do; to smooth “lumpy funding,” the idea that the university uses endowments to 
maintain a constant level of spending across time; to provide liquidity in the form of easily 
accessed returns; and “to provide insulation from outside demands,” the idea that by being 
financially independent, universities are able to shield their decision-making from the whims of 
the market.  
However, Hansmann eventually concluded that none of the explanations are adequate, a 
position with which Hoxby (2013) agrees.  She proposed an alternative model that renders the 
university’s role as that of a venture capitalist. The university, from the perspective of a venture 
capitalist, faces an investment dilemma (Hoxby, 2013; Brown and Tiu, 2013). It can choose to 
invest in activities that either boost human capital, such as research funding and paying 
professors, or boost financial capital, since money from endowments can be used to invest in 
financial markets and generate financial returns. There is an intertemporal aspect to this problem: 
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the university has to allocate its resources such that it can guarantee the availability of resources 
for today’s generation versus tomorrow’s generation. Part of the problem for the university is to 
get alumni and other affiliated parties that have benefited from its investment to give back so that 
it has more resources to support future generations. Hoxby argues that endowments exist to help 
solve this problem by providing an avenue for affiliated parties to aid the university with its 
social venture capitalist role. 
Merton (1993) supports the view that endowments serve as a device to hedge against 
shocks in costs, which is closer to a classic intertemporal consumption-leisure problem. The role 
of the endowment is to make sure that in a time when negative shocks hit, the university has 
ample resources to cushion the effects of the shock, and in a time of positive shocks, the 
university does not overspend. This implies that we would expect endowment payouts to 
increase during a bad market time, and to decrease during a good market time. Black (1976) 
implicitly supports this view, considering the endowment fund as “just one of the university’s 
source of income.” 
However, empirical literature has documented that this phenomenon happens rarely. 
Brown et al. (2014) found that in bad times, universities spend less from their endowments, but 
in good times, there is no distinguishable change in endowment payout. They also found that a 
factor that drives endowment payout is the “president’s benchmark,” which is the ratio of the 
current endowment size to its size at the beginning of the president’s tenure. The idea behind this 
is that university leadership wants to maintain (and increase) the size of the endowment from 
what they inherited, and so they are sensitive about taking money from the endowment in times 
of crisis, which is already shrunken due to bad financial market timing. This provides some 
evidence for the view that universities have been accumulating money for purposes other than 
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economic ones. This is consistent with Conti-Brown’s observation (2010) that in a time of crisis, 
instead of using more money from the endowment to maintain the existing level of spending, 
universities instead choose to cut budgets and lay off staff, despite the fact that the endowment 
remains sufficiently sizable to allow for maintaining the current level of spending. Conti-Brown 
concluded that universities’ behavior with respect to endowment payouts thus cannot be 
explained wholly by economic reasons, and theorized that endowments (and their sizes) serve as 
an indicator of institutional prestige, which makes maintaining a big size important. This is 
supported by Hansmann’s suspicion that economic motives do not sufficiently explain why 
endowments exist (Hansmann, 1990). Dinerstein et al. (2014) further found that during the crisis, 
private institutions used fiscal stimulus funds to replace spending from endowments, which 
allowed for a ten-cent decrease in endowment spending for every dollar of stimulus federal 
research funds. To put it more crudely, universities have been “hoarding” money. 
 Other factors that can influence endowment spending include payout policies (Brown and 
Tiu, 2013) and investment returns as a function of asset allocation (Goetzmann and Oster, 2013). 
Brown and Tiu (2013) found that the bigger the size of a college endowment and the smaller the 
returns, the more likely it is that the college would change its stated payout policy. Payout 
policies are followed by changes in investment allocation, not the other way around. Goetzmann 
and Oster (2013) further found, somewhat surprisingly, that the determinant of colleges’ 
allocation of investment assets is not the performance of those assets, but the performance of 
portfolios that belong to a college’s near competition schools and single closest competitor. For 
example, the endowment portfolio of Harvard University is more likely to be re-allocated if it 
underperforms that of Yale University, than if it underperforms itself in the previous years 
(Goetzmann and Oster, 2013). 
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Given the time-enduring nature of the university’s investment problem (Hoxby, 2013; 
Brown and Tiu, 2013), there is little reason to expect that the university would frequently change 
its endowment payout policies and investment strategies. However, Brown and Tiu (2013) found 
that between 2003 and 2011, university leadership changes both endowment payout policies and 
investment strategies too frequently to be consistent with theoretical behavior. More 
interestingly, in response to the recent financial crisis, endowments with access to temporary 
payouts were more likely to retain their existing payout policies, while those without such access 
were more likely to change their permanent payout policies, which provides some evidence that 
colleges do use endowments to get access to financial resources to accommodate the financial 
losses of their returns and increase in costs during the downturn. 
While both public and private universities and colleges theoretically provide financial 
aid, in reality such phenomenon is much more common at private institutions than at public ones. 
According to Kane (1999), in the 1992-1993 school year, only 11 percent of full-time students at 
public institutions received any institutional grant aid, while private institutions increasingly 
provided grant aid to a larger share of their student body. Private institutions have the ability to 
re-channel funds from fiscal stimulus to keep tuition down and aid up for their students, which 
means they have more flexibility in terms of how they spend money than public institutions, 
which are bound by states policies that came with the subsidies (Bettinger and Williams, 2013). 
Dinerstein et al. (2014) also documented that institutions do adjust their spending in responses to 
changes in revenue sources. This provides the basis for me using only private schools.  
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4. Data 
4.1. Data Overview 
I use a panel data set called the Integrated Postsecondary Data System (IPEDS), 
developed by the National Center for Education Statistics, which is part of the US Department of 
Education. These data have been extensively used in studies related to education and 
endowments, including Brown, Dimmock and Weisbenner (2012), Brown et al. (2014), and 
Long (2014). The data set provides detailed information on an extensive array of institutional 
characteristics, including college finances, endowment values and financial aid. With this data 
set, I am able to determine revenue, expense and spending decisions at the institution level.  
I restrict my sample to 94 private liberal arts colleges with endowment per capita above 
$50,000 in fiscal year 2006, and use data on these colleges from fiscal year 2006 to 2017. I 
include only those colleges that report all expenses for all years in the twelve-year period. I focus 
on private liberal arts colleges for several reasons. Firstly, public institutions’ financing 
structures are complicated due to the heavy involvement of federal and state funding, whose 
effects would potentially interact with that of institutional endowments on spending decisions. 
Bettinger and Williams (2013) found that public universities might use state policy to hedge 
against federal policy, while taking advantage of federal policy in times of recession to hedge 
against strained state budgets. The state and federal subsidies also come with strings attached, in 
the form of state and federal heavy involvement in the university’s decision-making regarding 
setting tuition prices and which students to accept. Because I want to strictly look at how 
institutional endowment influences spending, including public universities would have 
underestimated the relationship because there are so many other factors at play for public 
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universities. Private institutions also have the most flexibility in terms of how they allocate their 
funds (Sarubbi and Pingel, 2018). Thus, focusing on private institutions allows me to isolate the 
effects of endowments from the effects of public funding. 
Secondly, I focus on liberal arts colleges because their overarching commitment to 
providing an undergraduate education ensures straightforward internal financing structures. Big 
research universities have a number of different goals and have to allocate their resources across 
different groups of constituents (undergraduate students, graduate students, professional students, 
major sports teams, research institutes, etc.). This large scope of commitment complicates the 
financing structures and decision making within these universities, and therefore blurs the 
connection between endowments and expenditure. Thus, focusing on liberal arts colleges allows 
me to more cleanly examine the effects of endowments on spending. 
Indiscriminately including all liberal arts colleges would introduce noise to my sample, 
since the majority of these small institutions do not have a sizable endowment, and mainly rely 
on tuition revenue to fund their operations. This means that there are not a lot of effects of 
endowments on spending decisions anyway. To prevent this problem, I further restrict my 
sample to include only the schools with endowment per capita in 2006 of at least $50,000, 
because only endowments of at least such amounts would have been meaningfully affected by 
the financial crisis. 
4.2. Trends in Expenditure, Endowments and Revenue from 2006 to 2017 
Figure 1 illustrates the trend in average total expenditure per student at liberal arts 
colleges over the twelve-year period. During the period leading up to the financial crisis, colleges 
consistently increased spending per capita. Total spending per student peaked in 2009, right 
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before the financial crisis, and dropped dramatically in the two following years, suggesting that 
college leadership was extremely sensitive to economic shocks, making adjustments almost 
immediately as they saw how the market conditions were unfolding. As the financial crisis 
officially ended and financial markets stabilized and began to rebound, colleges gradually 
returned to their upward trend in total spending, and by 2014, total spending per capita rose to 
almost the same level as it was before the crisis. 
Figure 2 demonstrates the close relationship between endowment values and the stock 
market. Because colleges heavily invest their endowments in the stock market and because their 
alternative investments often have returns that are correlated with the stock market, endowments 
grow when market conditions are positive. An improvement in the stock market increases the 
endowment today, but that increase is not captured in the data until the next round of annual 
surveys are carried out. As a result, I adjusted values for the S&P 500 forward by a year to line 
up its movements with those of average endowment per student.  
A natural question to follow is whether all colleges with endowments of different sizes 
are affected in the same way when the stock market fluctuates. Figure 3 shows that the patterns 
of change are certainly very similar, if not almost identical, across the board.  This suggests that 
endowments are managed in similar ways across colleges, which means that they generally track 
the same movements as the market develops. This interpretation is consistent with findings from 
Goetzmann and Oster (2013) and Seltzer (2018a): schools follow each other’s steps when it 
comes to endowment portfolio allocation, and asset allocations remained virtually unchanged 
across institutions of all sizes from 2008 to 2017.  
While the patterns are very similar, the levels of returns are not identical. When broken 
up by quartiles of their endowment values in 2006, the colleges with endowments in the top 
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quartiles receive slightly higher returns when the market is strong compared to colleges with 
endowments in the bottom quartiles. One explanation for this is that the most heavily endowed 
colleges had the most capital to invest in the financial markets, providing them with access to 
investments with higher returns, albeit with greater risk, than institutions with smaller 
endowments. This is illustrated in Figure 4, which shows that annual returns at higher 
endowment schools are more volatile over time.  
Figure 5 illustrates the trajectory of spending at colleges in different endowment quartiles 
over the twelve-year period. Across the board, all colleges dramatically slashed spending 
immediately as the financial crisis hit. The greatest decline in spending immediately following 
the crisis occurred at schools with the largest endowment values beforehand. Since they lost the 
most money in the crisis, they cut spending the most. Total spending generally resumed its 
previous path as the crisis waned. Spending at colleges in the bottom endowment quartile lagged 
somewhat relative to the others. That is most likely because they are more reliant on tuition 
revenue, which is strongly dependent on income, and income growth remained sluggish for 
several years following the crisis. 
This proposition is supported in Figure 6, which shows the trend of net tuition revenue by 
2006 endowment quartiles. Though generally right before the crisis, colleges saw their net tuition 
revenue peak, the drop is the sharpest for colleges with smaller endowment values. Colleges with  
the largest endowments only witnessed a mild drop in net tuition revenue, even at the height of 
the crisis. In the immediate post-crisis period, colleges with above median endowment levels saw 
their net tuition revenue pick right up, while colleges with endowments below the median 
continued seeing their revenue unchanged or dropping even further.  
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This indicates that wealthier schools are not only less reliant on tuition revenues – they 
also have wealthier students who can afford the high price of a private undergraduate education 
even during the financial crisis, a period during which many families suffered wealth losses and 
could no longer finance their children’s higher education. In contrast, less heavily-endowed 
colleges face the dual problem of being very reliant on tuition revenue to finance their 
operations, and of having students who do not have similar financial capacity as those at heavily-
endowed colleges. 
Figure 7 focuses specifically on one aspect of spending on financial aid, namely the 
percentage of students receiving aid. If endowments have a significant effect on financial aid, I 
would expect to see some positive correlation between the movements of endowment values and 
the percent of students receiving any financial aid. That does not seem to be the case, however. 
In fact, at the height of the crisis, the most heavily-endowed colleges, which suffered the greatest 
losses in endowment values during the crisis, actually experienced increases in percent of 
students receiving any financial aid. This might have been driven by the fact that since many 
families lost their ability to finance their children’s education due to the crisis, their financial 
needs became greater and more students became eligible for financial aid. This is consistent with 
the increase in demand for Pell grants during the crisis that Long (2014) found. Since many of 
these heavily-endowed colleges have meet-full-need financial aid policies, the increase in 
demonstrated need was met, resulting in the increase in percent of students receiving aid.  
 20 
4.3. Summary Statistics 
Table 1 provides the description of all variables that I include in my econometric analysis 
and table 2 reports summary statistics of those variables.2 The average college in my sample has 
an endowment of $280 million and annually spends $86.7 million in total, more than a third of 
which is spent on instructional expenses. More than half of its total annual expenses are financed 
by its net tuition revenue, private gifts, grants and contracts ($38.6 million and $15.3 million, 
respectively, on average). Research expenses are negligible, which is consistent with the fact that 
liberal arts colleges primarily focus their resources on undergraduate education. Figure 8 
provides a detailed breakdown of expenditures at these colleges across the most significant 
spending categories: instruction, research, academic support, student service, institutional 
support, public service, auxiliary enterprises, independent operations, and other expenses. 
Because I am especially interested in the relationship between endowments and spending 
on financial aid, ideally I would want to have data that directly report the amount of institutional 
funds colleges spend on financial aid each year. While the IPEDS data set does not directly 
report this information, it does report the average amount of institutional aid awarded to students, 
and the percentage of students receiving any financial aid each year. These variables very closely 
reflect the amount colleges spend on financial aid and so they are reasonable proxies for 
expenditures on financial aid. 
At these 94 liberal colleges, typically 89 percent of the students receive some amount of 
financial aid; each aided student receiving almost $24,000 of institutional aid, on average. In my 
sample of liberal arts colleges, 38.3 percent have a meet-full-need policy, which means these 
schools are committed to providing any student with an amount of financial aid that matches her 
                                                
2 All numbers are inflation-adjusted and converted in 2017 dollars. 
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demonstrated need, if accepted (note that this does not necessarily imply that the admission 
process is need-blind, which means that financial need is not taken into account in the 
admissions decision). Table 3 provides a breakdown of all liberal art colleges in my sample by 
quartiles of the size of their 2006 endowments, indicating which of them meet full need.  
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5. Econometric Specification 
The question I seek to address is whether changes in endowment spending have a causal 
effect on spending in a variety of dimensions at liberal arts colleges. The main specification I 
estimate takes the form:  
 Spendingcit = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 *Endowit-1 + 𝛼i + 𝛼t-1 + 𝜀it-1  (1) 
where Spendingcit is spending in dollar value on category c at institution i in year t, Endowit-1 is 
the size of the endowment at the same institution in the previous year, 𝛼i controls for time-
invariant fixed effects at said institution, 𝛼t-1 controls for fixed effects in the same year as the 
endowment, and 𝜀it-1 is a random error term. The coefficient of interest is 𝛽1, the effect of 
endowment size on spending on the categories of interest. 
The inclusion of institution fixed effects means that we compare differences in the 
dependent variable to differences in endowment sizes within institutions. Any differences in the 
dependent variable driven by time-invariant characteristics of an institution, such as geographic 
location, stated mission and values, and the like are controlled for. I also include time fixed 
effects, which capture all factors that influence all institutions in a particular year. These controls 
allow for variations in endowment sizes to be the primary driver of variations in spending within 
a particular category within the same institution along the years from 2006 to 2017. For example, 
I am comparing how changes in Wellesley College’s endowment affect different types of 
spending differentially from other schools over the same period.  
 However, OLS estimates of the above equation may be biased because it might overlook 
the fact that these colleges may be different in their approach to investing their endowment at a 
point in time, which might be responsible for the different levels of endowment spending. For 
example, schools that are trying to increase their spending might invest more aggressively. 
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Different schools also adjust their spending policies differently, which is endogenous in this 
regression.  
The financial crisis, however, provides a means to use an instrumental variables approach 
to overcome this problem. The goal of this approach is to find an instrumental variable that is 
correlated with endowment value in a particular school and year, but unlikely to be uncorrelated 
with spending across categories at that school and year.  
 The robustness of these instrumental variables depends heavily on their correlation with 
the independent variables in the first stage equation. I begin analysis of the effect of the financial 
crisis on endowment sizes by proxying the financial crisis with data on the average annual 
returns of the S&P 500, which accounts for overall market conditions. The question of whether 
the financial crisis is a good instrument for endowment size then hinges on the correlation 
between the S&P 500 and endowment size. We include a variable for the S&P 500, a variable for 
the endowment size of the 94 schools in 2006, long before the crisis hit, and interact these two 
variables to allow for the effects of the business cycle on schools’ initial endowment. The 
instrumental variable I use is the interaction between the S&P 500 and the endowment values in 
2006. This interaction provides estimates for endowment values had schools kept their portfolios 
the same as in 2006. The worry is that as the financial market was going through chaos, schools 
were trying to respond to those fluctuations, and these responses are endogenous. So by using 
this interaction, I am essentially estimating the effect of the endowment on spending if the 
endowment was solely dependent on the stock market, which is exogenous. The first stage 
regression is as follows: 
Endowmentit = 𝜃0 + 𝜃1*S&P500t-1 +  𝜃2*Endow2006i + 𝜃3*(S&P500t-1*Endow2006i) + υit-1  
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Including institution and time fixed effects allows me to capture the effects of the first order 
S&P500 and Endow2006 variables, the former being institution-specific, and the latter being 
time-invariant. Then, an equivalent first stage regression is: 
Endowmentit-1 = 𝜃0 + 𝜃1*(S&P500t-1*Endow2006i) + 𝜑i + 𝜑t-1 + υit-1   (3) 
The second stage equation is: 




Table 4 reports OLS and IV estimates of the impact of changes in endowment values on 
the overall budget at liberal arts colleges. The estimate of the coefficient on the interaction 
between the S&P 500 and endowment values in 2006, 𝜃1, in equation (3), the first stage in the IV 
specification, is statistically significant at the 1-percent level with an F-statistic of 73.91, thus 
ensuring the relevance of my instrument. Overall, the endowment value has a positive effect on 
net tuition revenue, private gifts, grants and contracts, and total expenses. In particular, in my 
preferred IV estimates, every dollar increase in the endowment causes colleges to increase total 
spending by 7.9 cents.  
Changes in endowment values, though, are correlated with changes in gifts and net tuition 
revenue. When times are good, all three components of the budget increase together. We also see 
that a one-dollar increase in the endowment is associated with a 2.3-cent increase in net tuition 
revenue and 1.5-cent increase in revenue from private gifts, grants and contracts (although this 
last estimate is not statistically significant). Of the 7.9-cent increase in total spending, the 
remainder, 4.1 percent, presumably comes from endowment spending. This estimate is consistent 
with typical rates of endowment spending that schools report (Seltzer, 2018a).  
Table 5 summarizes the impact of changes in endowment values on seven main spending 
categories. The endowment value has a significant positive effect on most categories of 
spending. For every dollar increase in the endowment, instructional expenses increase by 2.5 
cents, academic support and student service expenses increase by 1.3 cents each, and institutional 
support and auxiliary enterprises expenses increase by 1.2 cents each. 
My identification strategy is based on variation in endowment values from the financial 
crisis, a period in which endowment values actually fell. In this context, then, as endowment 
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values decreased, colleges cut total spending and spending on the aforementioned categories. 
This result suggests that colleges do not use endowments as a “rainy day fund.” Reductions in 
the endowment cause colleges to adjust spending down to accommodate its diminished value. 
This result provides evidence that refutes both Tobin and Merton’s predictions, and supports 
Conti-Brown’s findings (Tobin, 1974; Merton, 1993; Conti-Brown, 2010). The coefficient on 
research expense is not significant, which implies that I cannot statistically distinguish whether 
the estimated effect of endowment changes on research spending is zero. This insignificance is 
consistent with the liberal arts colleges’ emphasis on undergraduate instruction and reduced 
emphasis on research.  
Table 6 presents estimates of the effect of endowment values on financial aid outcomes. 
In the preferred IV specification, as endowment values decline, the percent of students who 
receive any financial aid increases. In particular, every $10 million decrease in the endowment 
results in a 7.7-percentage point increase in the percent of students receiving any aid. This can be 
explained by the fact that as the financial crisis causes endowment values to decrease, it 
simultaneously causes families to lose wealth, hence increasing the number of students who 
qualify for aid. Schools do not appear to have admitted fewer low-income students as a result to 
save money. In fact, they enrolled more of them. Changes in endowment levels do not have a 
statistically significant effect on the average amount of institutional aid each student receives, 
just the number of students receiving aid. At least in the short-run and under those 
circumstances, colleges did not disadvantage low-income students even when their wealth 
suffered. 
Next, I examine the impact of endowments on colleges that commit to a meet-full-need 
(“MFN”) policy versus those that do not (“non-MFN”). Schools that meet full need were subject 
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to greater demand for financial aid funds during the financial crisis because they do not have the 
ability to alter their financial aid budget. Students need what students need; that need will 
increase during a recession. Schools that do not meet full need are under no such obligation. 
Table 7 reports the OLS and IV estimates of the impact of endowment values on the 
overall budget between these two types of colleges. Overall, the endowment has a positive and 
significant relationship with tuition revenue, and private gifts, grants and contracts for non-MFN 
colleges, but not for MFN colleges. With every dollar increase in endowment values, MFN 
colleges increase their total spending by 5 cents, consistent with the 5-percent endowment payout 
rule of thumb that colleges generally abide by. The fact that MFN colleges do not see their net 
tuition revenue change as their endowment values drop is an indicator that their students come 
from wealthier background that allow them to afford a college education even in times of market 
distress. For non-MFN colleges, the increase of 15.4 cents in total spending associated with 
every dollar increase in the endowment can be completely explained by the total of a 5.5-cent 
increase in net tuition revenue, 5.8-cent increase in private gifts, grants and contracts, with the 
remaining 4.1 cents coming from annual endowment payouts, as I discussed earlier. The same 
calculation for MFN colleges also generates a similar endowment spending rate of 4.3 percent, 
which suggests that the difference in spending between the two types of colleges does not stem 
from different levels of endowment spending but from different levels of other revenue sources, 
namely net tuition revenue and private gifts, grants and contracts, which are more strongly 
correlated with endowment values at non-MFN colleges. 
Tables 8 reports the OLS and IV estimates of the impact on colleges across spending 
categories by MFN status. Changes in endowment values are very important for non-MFN 
colleges: the effect of endowments on total expense for non-MFN colleges is three times bigger 
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than that for MFN colleges; on instruction expense, the effect is seven times bigger; on academic 
support, student service and auxiliary enterprises expenses, it is more than twice as big. This 
result is surprising. Colleges that commit to a meet-full-aid policy tend to have bigger 
endowments and so are more sensitive to changes in endowment values. As a result, I would 
expect them to slash spending more dramatically when their endowment falls. This result might 
suggest that even in times of crisis, MFN colleges use some of their endowments to cushion the 
effects of the shocks so that they do not have to slash spending as much as non-MFN colleges. It 
is quite interesting to see that MFN colleges cut back more on academic support and student 
service expenses so that they do not have to cut back as much on instruction expenses, while the 
opposite is true for non-MFN colleges. This can be explained by the fact that MFN colleges tend 
to be higher-ranked schools and it is important for them to protect their reputation for providing a 
good education. 
The results for financial aid outcomes indicate that whether a college commits to a meet-
full-need policy does not make a difference regarding its spending on financial aid. Specifically, 
in table 9, the estimates for percent of students receiving any aid are not statistically significant 
in any specification. Since the overall effect among all colleges is negative and significant, it is 
likely that the problem in this disaggregated analysis is about loss of power. In the smaller 
samples, I am not able to generate sufficient precision to clearly delineate the separate impacts.  
However, non-MFN colleges also appear to provide greater support for their low-income 
students who do receive aid when the financial crisis damaged their endowments. At these 
institutions, every 10-million-dollar decrease in endowment values results in an increase of $303 
in the average amount of institutional aid received per student. This result provides additional 
evidence that colleges tried to do “the right thing” even as their wealth was suffering losses.  
 29 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, I investigate whether endowment levels have a causal relationship on liberal 
arts colleges’ expenditures by categories, especially expenditures on financial aid. Using an 
instrumental variables identification strategy, I find that changes in endowment values 
consistently result in changes in non-financial aid expenditures in the same direction. In the 
context of the 2008 financial crisis, drops in the value of endowments caused colleges to cut 
overall spending in each category. However, colleges continued to support low-income students. 
Indeed, they provided financial aid to even more students despite their lost wealth.  
My findings are consistent with Brown et al.’s findings and provide evidence that rejects 
both Tobin and Merton’s theories of the role of the endowment (Tobin, 1974; Merton, 1993; 
Brown et al., 2014). Overall, colleges do not use their endowments to smooth spending in times 
of crisis. The effects of a decrease in endowment values are exacerbated by decreases in other 
streams of revenue, namely net tuition revenue and private gifts. These losses subject colleges to 
heightened financial constraints and prompt them to cut spending. This is not true, however, for 
spending on financial aid. Apparently, spending decisions are not solely dependent on 
endowment sizes. College leadership makes strategic spending decisions to cater to specific 
goals of the college, and de-emphasizes less essential aspects of the college’s operations. 
Financial aid appears to be the component of a college’s spending that it values most highly. 
My results have meaningful implications for the endowment tax policy debate. While the 
tax is intended to stimulate endowment spending, the decrease in income resulting from the tax 
imposition is likely to cause colleges to cut spending, instead of spending more to avoid the tax. 
Colleges are likely to hold the line on financial aid spending, but are unlikely to spend more on 
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financial aid without an increase in student need. Overall, the impact of the tax is unlikely to 
accomplish the goals of its supporters. 
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8. Tables 
Table 1. Description of variables. 
Variable Description 
 
Net tuition revenue 
 
 
Amount of tuition and education fees, net of any state, local or institutional grants. 
 
Endowment Endowment values at the beginning of the fiscal year. 
 
Private gifts, grants and contracts Total amount of non-governmental gifts, contribution non-exchange transactions and amounts 
reimbursable under the the terms of a grant or contract. Examples include bequests, pledges, research 
projects and training programs. 
  
Total expense Total amount of spending during the fiscal year. 
 
Instruction expense Expenses for both credit and non-credit educational activities related to general academic instruction 
conducted by the teaching faculty. 
 
Research expense Expenses for activities dedicated to research purposes, including institutes and research centers, as well as 
individual and project research. 
 
Academic support expense Expenses for services that support instruction, research or public service purposes, such as expenses for 
libraries, museums, academic development, and academic administration. 
 
Student service expense Expenses for admissions, registrar activities and activities that aim at personal and professional 




Institutional support expense Expenses for the daily operational support of the institution, such as administrative services, legal and 
fiscal operations, and public relations. 
 
Public service expense Expense for activities dedicated to public service, including community services. 
 
Auxiliary enterprises expense Expenses for the operation of services to students, staff and faculty, such as residence halls, food services, 
college stores, room and boards, etc. 
 
Independent operations expense Expenses for operations unrelated to the primary missions of the institution (instruction, research, public 
service) but might indirectly contribute to the advancement of those missions, such as information 
technology expenses. 
 
Other expenses Expenses spent on categories not listed above. 
 
Percent of students receiving any aid Percentage of the student body who receive some amount of financial aid. 
 
Average amount of institutional aid 
received per student 
 
Average amount of financial aid each student who qualifies for aid receives. 
 
Meet Full Need Dummy variable that accounts for whether an institution is committed to meeting full demonstrated need. 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics of Main Variables (in millions of 2017$). 
Variable Observations Median Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Net tuition revenue 1,128 38.6 42.9 24.7 4.4 151 
Endowment 1,128 280 463 473 49.9 2,450 
Private gifts, grants and contracts 1,128 15.3 20.8 18.4 0.3 239 
Total expense 1,128 86.7 95.9 52.7 17 300 
Instruction expense 1,128 30.4 35.8 20.8 0.026 106 
Research expense 1,128 0.7 1.6 2.3 0 13.1 
Academic support expense 1,128 8.4 9.9 7.4 0 47.5 
Student service expense 1,128 13 14.1 7 0.011 48.7 
Institutional support expense 1,128 14.5 16.5 9.3 0.018 59.5 
Public service expense 1,128 0 0.6 1.2 0 8.1 
Auxiliary enterprises expense 1,128 15 16.3 9.9 0 71.8 
Independent operations expense 1,128 0 0.054 0.5 0 6.2 
Other expenses 1,128 0 0.8 3.9 -2.4 82.3 
Percent of students receiving any aid 1,128 89 81 19 35 100 
Average amount of institutional aid 
received per student 
1,128 0.024 0.025 0.008 0.004 0.047 
Meet Full Need 1,128 0 0.383 0.486 0 1 
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Table 3. Liberal Arts Colleges by the size of their 2006 endowments. 
Bottom Quartile 2nd Quartile 3rd Quartile Top Quartile 
Wesleyan College ($53 million) Washington College ($157 million) Bates College ($260 million)* DePauw University ($568 million) 
St. John's College ($71 million) Transylvania University ($160 million) The College of Wooster ($273 million) Mount Holyoke College ($579 million)* 
Pitzer College ($76 million)* Randolph College ($167 million) Gettysburg College ($274 million) College of the Holy Cross ($584 million)* 
Hiram College ($79 million) Hanover College ($178 million) Rhodes College ($280 million) Denison University ($601 million) 
Cornell College ($79 million) Hobart William Smith Colleges ($178 million) St Olaf College ($283 million) Bryn Mawr College ($630 million)* 
Emory & Henry College ($91 million) Kalamazoo College ($181 million) Willamette University ($286 million) Colgate University ($631 million)* 
Presbyterian College ($102 million) Ohio Wesleyan University ($182 million) 
Sewanee-The University of the South 
($317 million) 
Macalester College ($647 million)* 
Westminster College ($108 million) Hendrix College ($188 million) Spelman College ($324 million) Carleton College ($678 million)* 
Millsaps College ($113 million) Wheaton College ($189 million) 
Franklin and Marshall College ($348 
million)* 
Wesleyan University ($709 million)* 
Sweet Briar College ($115 million) Barnard College ($192 million)* Southwestern University ($351 million) Bowdoin College ($726 million)* 
Alma College ($119 million) Albion College ($196 million) Occidental College ($351 million)* Hamilton College ($749 million)* 
Hollins University ($127 million) Kenyon College ($198 million)* Agnes Scott College ($359 million) Lafayette College ($795 million)* 
Lycoming College ($127 million) Goucher College ($200 million) Wheaton College ($369 million) Vassar College ($843 million)* 
Roanoke College ($128 million) Centre College ($203 million) Union College ($374 million)* Oberlin College ($884 million)* 
Randolph-Macon College ($130 million) Illinois Wesleyan University ($205 million) Whitman College ($391 million) Middlebury College ($906 million)* 
Beloit College ($133 million) Connecticut College ($207 million)* 
Claremont McKenna College ($420 
million)* 
Smith College ($1300 million)* 
Wittenberg University ($135 million) Lawrence University ($236 million) Wabash College ($423 million) Amherst College ($1449 million)* 
Austin College ($135 million) Skidmore College ($247 million) Reed College ($425 million) Swarthmore College ($1461 million)* 
Ursinus College ($138 million) Harvey Mudd College ($250 million)* Earlham College ($475 million) University of Richmond ($1516 million)* 
Hampden-Sydney College ($142 million) Scripps College ($253 million)* Trinity College ($477 million)* Wellesley College ($1601 million)* 
Saint Johns University ($143 million) University of Puget Sound ($253 million) Davidson College ($484 million)* Pomona College ($1632 million)* 
Wofford College ($147 million) Drew University ($256 million) Haverford College ($495 million)* Williams College ($1692 million)* 
Allegheny College ($151 million) Dickinson College ($259 million) Colby College ($532 million)* Grinnell College ($1745 million)* 
Birmingham Southern College ($155 
million)  
Furman ($539 million) 
 
* indicates institutions with meet-full-need policy. 
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Table 4. Impact of Endowment on Overall Budget for All Liberal Arts Colleges. 
  OLS IV 
Net tuition revenue 0.014*** 0.023*** 
  (0.004) (0.005) 
Private gifts, grants and contracts -0.00241 0.0151 
 (0.0109) (0.0170) 
Total expense 0.062*** 0.079*** 
 
(0.011) (0.010) 
Note: The estimate on the instrument in the first-stage is 0.00031, with a 
standard error of 0.00004, significant at the 1% level. The F-statistic for the 
first-stage regression in the IV is 73.91. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5. Impact of Endowment on Spending Categories for All Liberal Arts Colleges. 
  OLS IV 
Instruction expense 0.017*** 0.024*** 
 
(0.003) (0.004) 
Research expense (x100) 0.044 0.027 
 
(0.042) (0.064) 
Academic support expense 0.009*** 0.013*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) 
Student service expense 0.010*** 0.013*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) 
Institutional support expense 0.009*** 0.012*** 
 
(0.002) (0.003) 
Public Service (x100) 0.095 0.118 
 
(0.076) (0.072) 
Auxiliary Enterprises 0.011** 0.012** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) 
Note: The estimate on the instrument in the first-stage is 0.00031, with a standard 
error of 0.00004, significant at the 1% level. The F-statistic for the first-stage 
regression in the IV is 73.91. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6. Impact on Financial Aid for All Liberal Arts Colleges. 
  OLS IV 
Percent of students receiving any aid -0.049 -0.078** 
 (0.033) (0.039) 




Note: All coefficients are for every $10,000,000 increase in 
endowment. The estimate on the instrument in the first-stage is 
0.00031, with a standard error of 0.00004, significant at the 1% 
level. The F-statistic for the first-stage regression in the IV is 
73.91. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 




Table 7. Impact of Endowment on Overall Budget for Colleges that Meet Full Need vs. Ones that Do Not. 
  Meet Full Need Not Meet Full Need 
  OLS IV OLS IV 
 Net tuition revenue 0.001 0.002 0.039** 0.055** 
  (0.004) (0.005) (0.017) (0.024) 
Private gifts, grants and contracts -0.013 0.005 0.014 0.058** 
 (0.015) (0.026) (0.030) (0.023) 
Total expense 0.044*** 0.050*** 0.119*** 0.154*** 
 (0.013) (0.010) (0.035) (0.040) 
Note: In the IV specification for MFN schools, the estimate on the instrument in the first-stage regression 
is 0.00029, with a standard error of 0.00005, significant at the 1% level. The F-statistic for the first-stage 
regression in the IV is 38.99. In the IV specification for non-MFN schools, the estimate on the instrument 
in the first-stage regression is 0.000289, with a standard error of 0.00010, significant at the 1% level. The 
F-statistic for the first-stage regression in the IV is 8.84.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8. Impact of Endowment on Spending Categories for Colleges that Meet Full Need vs. Ones that Do Not. 
  Meet Full Need Not Meet Full Need 
  OLS IV OLS IV 
Instruction expense 0.008*** 0.008** 0.042*** 0.060*** 
 
(0.002) (0.004) (0.011) (0.010) 
Research expense (x100) 0.021 -0.009 0.292** 0.197 
 
(0.052) (0.084) (0.120) (0.204) 
Academic support expense 0.007*** 0.011*** 0.017** 0.026*** 
 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.006) 
Student service expense 0.009*** 0.011*** 0.017*** 0.030*** 
 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) 
Institutional support expense 0.004* 0.004 0.019*** 0.021** 
 
(0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.009) 
Public Service (x100) 0.000317 0.079* 0.643 0.988* 
 
(0.000245) (0.042) (0.466) (0.558) 
Auxiliary Enterprises 0.011 0.012 0.013*** 0.024*** 
 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.003) (0.009) 
Note: In the IV specification for MFN schools, the estimate on the instrument in the first-stage regression is 
0.00029, with a standard error of 0.00005, significant at the 1% level. The F-statistic for the first-stage 
regression in the IV is 38.99. In the IV specification for non-MFN schools, the estimate on the instrument in the 
first-stage regression is 0.000289, with a standard error of 0.00010, significant at the 1% level. The F-statistic 
for the first-stage regression in the IV is 8.84.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 9. Impact on Financial Aid for Colleges that Meet Full Need vs. Ones that Do Not. 
  Meet Full Need Not Meet Full Need 
  OLS IV OLS IV 
Percent of students receiving any aid -0.025 0.007 -0.030 -0.093 
 (0.044) (0.053) (0.110) (0.207) 
Average amount of institutional aid received 
per student 
6.6 13.2 -200 -303* 
(22.2) (33.6) (143) (184) 
Note: In the IV specification for MFN schools, the estimate on the instrument in the first-
stage regression is 0.00029, with a standard error of 0.00005, significant at the 1% level. 
The F-statistic for the first-stage regression in the IV is 38.99. In the IV specification for 
non-MFN schools, the estimate on the instrument in the first-stage regression is 
0.000289, with a standard error of 0.00010, significant at the 1% level. The F-statistic for 
the first-stage regression in the IV is 8.84.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 








































Figure 1: Average Total Expenditure per Student 
at Liberal Arts Colleges over Time (in 2017 Dollars)
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Figure 8: Expenditure per Student as a Percentage of Total Expense in 
2016-2017 by Expense Category (in 2017 Dollars)
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